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IntroductIon
Comparative Perspectives on Divination and Ontology
William Matthews 
Abstract: Many divination systems are epistemologically justified accord-
ing to an explicit ontology: results are attributed to the work of an agent 
(gods, spirits) or to a cosmic principle (as in the Chinese concept qi). 
Analytically, we can thus distinguish between divination based on ‘agen-
tive ontology’, which raises the possibility of deception by gods or spirits, 
and ‘calculatory ontology’, which understands verdicts as calculations 
based on fixed principles. The relationship between explicit ontology 
and epistemic affordance, including the circumstances under which divi-
nation is subject to ontological explanation, suggests large-scale com-
parative questions concerning the wider socio-political and economic 
correlates of agentive and calculatory systems. These are exemplified in 
this special issue by the divergences between divination systems in the 
Greco-Roman world, in Han China, and among the Nuosu.
Keywords: agency, ancient Greece and Rome, calculation, China, compari-
son, divination, Nuosu, ontology
Throughout history and across societies, divination techniques have been taken 
seriously as a means of gaining knowledge about the world. The question of 
what kind of knowledge that is—and how it relates to variable conceptions of 
the world and can be known—has been a perennial concern in anthropology. 
Building on recent work that analyzes the relationship between divination 
and ontology (Holbraad 2012; Matthews 2017; Swancutt 2012), this special 
issue asks new questions that combine the potential of rich ethnographic and 
historical case studies to generate new insights with that of large-scale com-
parison in order to develop cumulative explanatory frameworks. How do onto-
logical assumptions relate to the nature of diagnosis and prediction as primary 
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functions of divination, and why do these assumptions vary across social and 
historical contexts? The ethnographic and historical record demonstrates wide 
variation, ranging from whether or not inaccuracy is possible within the logic 
of divinatory practice to skepticism and debate over the value of divination, 
to similarities between divinatory reasoning and other diagnostic and predic-
tive practices. In all cases, divination raises fundamental questions concerning 
humans and their capacity to know the cosmos. Under what circumstances 
do explicit ontological claims help divination to be considered predictive or 
explanatory, and how do these vary through time and space? How does this 
relate to the perceived position of humans in relation to nature or the divine? 
How do the aims of diviners and their clients differ, and do such differences 
rest on fundamentally different assumptions? 
This special issue takes steps toward establishing a framework for under-
standing how ontological assumptions underpin—or follow from—assertions of 
divination’s diagnostic and predictive power, both in practice and in discourse. 
A collaboration between anthropologists and classicists, this issue draws on 
detailed ethnographic and historical cases to develop a comparative framework 
concerning the relationship between ontological claims associated with divina-
tion and divinatory epistemology. In doing so, its authors address questions 
such as the effects of explicit ontological assumptions on the ability to doubt 
oracles, the degree to which divinatory methods constrain or are constrained by 
ontological accounts, and the reasons why divination might be attached to an 
ontology in the first place.
It can no longer be said that divination, as a recurrent feature of human soci-
ety, has been the object of “remarkably little research” (Peek 1991c: 1). Indeed, 
since the publication of Philip Peek’s (1991b) edited volume African Divination 
Systems—classics such as E. E. Evans-Pritchard’s ([1937] 1976) study of Azande 
oracles and Victor Turner’s (1975) of Ndembu basket divination notwithstand-
ing—anthropologists of divination have produced a steady stream of dedicated 
studies. Nonetheless, African Divination Systems still stands out for bringing 
together ethnographic studies from a broad range of societies and exploring 
them in terms of cross-cutting themes summarized by Peek (1991a) in his 
characterization of ‘non-normal modes of cognition’. While many, if not most, 
ethnographic accounts of divination contribute to broader theoretical accounts 
of such practices, they tend to do so in what might be called a ‘bottom-up’ 
fashion, generalizing from particular divination systems and perspectives to 
comment on the character of divination in general. This has produced valuable 
insights into themes as diverse as the nature of truth (Holbraad 2012; Willis 
and Curry 2004), time (Swancutt 2012), authority (Whyte 1991), and legitimacy 
(Li 2019), as well as convergences of different scholars on general themes such 
as the interplay of intuition or association and reflection/ratiocination (Parkin 
1991; Swancutt 2006; Tedlock 2001). 
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Attempts to generate ‘top-down’ typologies and explanatory frameworks 
have been fewer (although not entirely absent) in anthropology, but more com-
mon in historical studies. These include David Zeitlyn’s comparisons of diagno-
sis and prediction in Mambila and Zande divination and economic forecasting 
(2012), and of text-based divination systems (2001); Lisa Raphals’s (2013) 
extended comparison of ancient Greek and Chinese divination (see also Lloyd 
1999); Kim Beerden’s (2013) study of Greek, Roman, and Neo-Assyrian divi-
nation; Peter Struck’s (2016) analysis of classical philosophical approaches to 
divination; William Matthews’s (forthcoming) distinction between ‘generative’ 
and ‘reductive’ divination; and Pascal Boyer’s (2020) explanation of divinatory 
authority in terms of ‘ostensive detachment’. Such perspectives illustrate the 
value of broader comparative analysis of the ethnographic and historical record 
based on cumulative data.
The contributions to the present issue draw on such perspectives to address 
‘ontology’ as a conception of the fundamental categories of beings. Instead of a 
methodological approach to the concept, similar to that formulated by Holbraad 
and Pedersen (2017), ontology in this collection is seen as an object of ethno-
graphic and historical inquiry, to be located in explicit statements about types of 
beings, such as the Roman-era reflections on humanity and the divine described 
by Elsa Simonetti (this issue), and practices that invoke their existence, for exam-
ple, the evidence for spirits found during Nuosu divination as recounted by Kath-
erine Swancutt (this issue). While this is not a strict philosophical definition, 
it is in line with recent discussions of the term in social anthropology, particu-
larly those approaches focusing on what Holbraad and Pedersen (2017: 55–65) 
describe as ‘deep ontology’, which is distinct from their own methodological 
approach. Exemplified by the work of Michael Scott and Philippe Descola, such 
an approach tends to focus on discerning an implicit account or set of prin-
ciples of ‘being’ from a range of social practices, including kinship, cosmology, 
selfhood, and so on. Scott (2007), for example, draws on principles of lineage 
organization among the Arosi of Solomon Islands to argue that they approach 
the world from the perspective of ‘poly-ontology’—of many distinct origins of 
being alongside one another. Meanwhile, Descola (2013) presents a classifica-
tion of all societies according to their ‘mode of identification’, a fundamental 
‘schema’ by which people order the world based on the relationship between 
the physical body and the subjective self, and the extent to which this is per-
ceived as shared by other beings. Such approaches often draw heavily on explicit 
beliefs or mythic accounts while attempting to make sense of a range of cultural 
practices—as does notably the work of Eduardo Viveiros de Castro (2007) on 
Amerindian ‘perspectivism’—but stand out for their emphasis on ontology as an 
underlying or implicit means of ordering perception and experience.1
Our perspective differs from this in its emphasis on the explicit categories of 
being invoked in divination and the effects of such explicit conceptualization. 
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Sharing the focus on the fundamental kinds of being considered to exist, but 
concentrating on the level of explicit explanation rather than hypothetical 
implicit distinctions, are other approaches more closely in line with ours in this 
issue. Influenced by anthropological debates and applying these to historical 
contexts, these include Olaf Almqvist’s (2018) examination of human-divine 
discontinuity in early Greek theogonies, Michael Puett’s (2002) discussion of 
assumptions about the relationship between the human and the divine in early 
Chinese political and philosophical discourse, and Geoffrey Lloyd’s (2012: 59) 
comparisons of ontologies as “accounts of what there is” in Greece, China, 
and the wider ethnographic and historical record. These scholars all deal with 
explicit accounts of types of beings concerned with the explanation of specific 
phenomena, such as the relationship between humans and gods.
Considering ontology in terms of the fundamental kinds of things that are 
considered to exist, as explicitly identified in divinatory practice, leaves ample 
room for debate and refinement on the part of the individual contributors to 
this special issue (and those who may take the subject up). This is particularly 
so with regard to the scale on which ontologies should be compared. In this 
issue, Elsa Simonetti emphasizes ontologies as the explicit perspectives of 
individual thinkers engaging with divination as an epistemological problem, 
while Olaf Almqvist and Katherine Swancutt focus on shared understandings 
of what exists to situate divination in relation to wider cultural contexts, while 
remaining alive to the differences that exist within societies and between divi-
natory situations. Other approaches focus on the explicit concepts mobilized 
in divination systems: Stéphanie Homola explores the relationship between 
ontology and epistemology, while William Matthews examines the effects of 
ontological conceptions on the persuasiveness of divination. In their commen-
taries, David Zeitlyn and Stephan Feuchtwang critically address the common 
threads between these arguments. Both emphasize the importance of paying 
attention to how ontologies are transmitted, respectively offering a cultural epi-
demiology-inspired critique and a conception of divinatory ‘stocks of images’ 
as civilizational chains of transmission.
This broad approach to ontology in terms of explicit principles helps avoid 
the problems of inferring ‘deep’ mechanisms that somehow guide general 
perception, including how evidence for such mechanisms could be derived 
ethnographically or historically, particularly given that the nature of human 
cognition makes their existence unlikely (Matthews 2021). It also distinguishes 
ontology from cosmology. While explicit cosmological theories undoubt-
edly require and elaborate explicit ontological foundations, cosmologies also 
become institutionalized through practices and social structures. This means 
that individuals can engage in cosmological practices without maintaining a 
systematic, explicit cosmological perspective, by virtue of social participation. 
The same can be said of ideology, with the addition that it, unlike cosmology, 
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need not be premised on a comprehensive account of what exists. Ontology, 
in contrast, is necessarily a product of individual reflection on the basic nature 
of being and beings. It does not make sense, therefore, to describe a practice 
as ‘ontological’ unless it is explicitly understood as such by its practitioners—
which would mean that they subjectively understand their actions to be pre-
mised on ontological principles (see Matthews, this issue).
Why Ask This Question?
What does an analytic focus on ontology do for scholarship on divination, and 
for anthropology and classics more generally? In light of the above discussion, 
while we might understand certain divination practices undertaken by certain 
individuals as explicable in part by subjective ontological understandings, we 
should pay as much attention to ontology as a phenomenon that itself requires 
explanation. Empirically, the link between divination and ontology is interesting 
precisely because plenty of ethnographic and historical examples exist of divina-
tory practices that are not accompanied by any kind of ontological elaboration 
as to why they might yield information about the world, even if they do rely on 
‘stocks of images’ (Feuchtwang, this issue), raising the question of why such 
elaborations do arise in other cases. It may be noted that this is a question of 
explicit epistemology, but when we find such explanations, they are invariably 
couched in ontological terms in the sense that types of beings, whether agents 
or natural forces, are held to communicate or provide access to information via 
divination. Notably, this is distinct from identifying categories of being that are 
referred to by divination systems, such as specific outcomes indicating particu-
lar persons, psychological states, and so on. All divination systems do this to a 
greater or lesser degree, and as such require individuals to mentally represent 
specific beings. Yet this is true of a huge range of social practices and does not 
necessitate (although it may involve) an explicit, let alone comprehensive, onto-
logical account. Certain divination practices, though, do rely on epistemological 
accounts, including methodological justifications rooted in explicit ontologies. 
These involve well-defined conceptions of the role of specific kinds of beings in 
providing certain kinds of information through specific media during divination.
Taking examples from the articles in this issue, such beings might be gods in 
ancient Greece and Rome, spirits among the Nuosu, or Heaven (tian) and the 
energy-substance qi in China. Other classic examples would include the oricha 
divinities in Ifá divination (Holbraad 2012), royal ancestors in Shang oracle-
bone divination (Keightley 1988), or the planets in Western astrology (Willis 
and Curry 2004). These stand in contrast to other forms of divination, includ-
ing Zande poison oracles (Evans-Pritchard [1937] 1976) and Mambila spider 
divination (Zeitlyn 2020, this issue), or even for that matter tarot cards or Carl 
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Jung’s reading of the Yijing. While relying on ‘stocks of images’ and thus draw-
ing links with various ontological categories in their interpretation, such forms 
of divination are considered by practitioners simply to ‘work’ without recourse 
to any further explanatory theory of why they do. That is, while they may refer 
to ontological categories as objects of inquiry, they do not draw on any explicit 
ontological accounts as a basis for their divinatory epistemology.
It bears emphasis that divination involves a dialogue or ‘conversation’ (Zeit-
lyn 2001) between diviner and client (and beyond). In this sense, divinatory 
verdicts involve some form of collaboration, but they also involve divergent 
perspectives, aims, and knowledge bases. It is thus possible, for example, for 
one, all, or no party of the divinatory dialogue to view the process in ontologi-
cal terms regardless of the practice itself, even if certain methods tend strongly 
toward being associated with ontological elaboration. It should be borne in 
mind as well that references to divinatory ontology (whether regarding meth-
ods, as here, or wider referents) necessarily generalize from a broad range of 
representations entertained by and among individuals in different contexts (a 
point returned to by Zeitlyn in his commentary).
As Boyer (2020) has argued, no such elaboration of how divination works 
is necessary for people to find it convincing as a source of information under 
the right circumstances, primarily because the practice removes obstacles to 
doubt by producing statements that do not appear to come from the diviner, 
and thus do not appear to be potentially subject to manipulation. An obvious 
focus of comparative study is therefore why some forms of divination do involve 
such elaboration, and whether it is retrospectively attached to an existing, non-
ontological practice or stems logically from prior beliefs about the world. This 
problem can be investigated on a range of scales, from the level of individual 
justification, to interaction between, and differing conceptions on the part of, 
diviners and clients, to community-wide inquiries, to long-term historical and 
political processes.
We can consider the broader end of this spectrum, that of long-term his-
torical processes, through the example of one of the most enduring forms of 
divination—the Yijing (I Ching, or Book of Changes), which consists of 64 six-
line diagrams (hexagrams) and commentaries on their interpretation. Its use in 
early China suggests both retrospective elaboration and new predictive affor-
dances granted by changing ontological assumptions. The divination text has 
a history of use as such since at least the late ninth century bce (Rutt [1996] 
2002: 30–33), but did not begin to attain any cosmological significance until 
the third century bce (Smith 2008: 7). From this point onward, cosmological 
explanations were increasingly integrated with the existing six-line hexagrams 
and their terse interpretive statements. By the time the Yijing had become part 
of the official ideological canon of the Han state in 136 bce, the hexagrams 
had transformed from polyvalent symbols to tightly defined indices of specific 
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cosmic conditions (Matthews 2016). This process was closely associated with 
the development of a ‘correlative cosmology’ of yin, yang, and qi (Nylan 
2010) in the last few centuries bce, and ultimately the adoption of this cosmol-
ogy became the metaphysical justification for the imperial unification of the 
Chinese warring states. In the case of the Yijing, then, an existing divination 
system became subject to ontological elaboration according to correlative cos-
mology. This cosmology, described in further detail by Matthews and Homola 
in this issue, posits an explicit ontological framework in which all beings are 
composed of qi operating according to constant principles. This logically allows 
the possibility of finding causal indices of cosmic phenomena, thus in turn 
affecting the nature of divinatory practice and what it is imagined to do.
Yet while in China use of the Yijing tended to shift toward an explicit ontol-
ogy and indexical form of prediction, the text’s reception in the West—heavily 
influenced by Richard Wilhelm’s translation (Baynes 2003) and Jung’s (1989) 
interpretation—has tended to focus on polyvalent symbolism as a means to 
‘self-knowledge’, in Jung’s words. In comparative perspective, we might ask 
what social and historical factors help explain this difference in the associa-
tion of divination with ontological assumptions. We might similarly ask why a 
shift to indexical interpretation occurred in China at all when, in a similar time 
frame and comparable manner, the expansion and consolidation of the Roman 
Empire was accompanied by state reliance on divination understood as a form 
of divine communication—particularly given the existence of a range of exist-
ing techniques, agentive and calculatory, in both contexts. In other words, why 
did different ontological accounts become associated with divination, and why 
did some of those accounts become more prevalent in different contexts? How 
did this relate to the role of communicative technologies? 
The emergence of calculatory techniques in China occurred in the context 
of long-term association of divination with writing, contrasting with a focus 
on oral oracular pronouncements in Greece, which did not apparently foster 
the same degree of elaboration of fixed indexical systems (Raphals 2013: 383).2 
Comparisons such as this illustrate the potential of investigating the causal rela-
tions between divination and ontology beyond the specific field of divination 
scholarship, and the potential for fine-grained classicist and anthropological 
analysis to inform debates on social processes at much larger scales. The chang-
ing relationship between divination and ontology in the case of the Yijing—con-
sidered diachronically and in synchronic comparison with the role of divination 
in other polities—raises further questions about the relationship between onto-
logical frameworks and changing political structures. This speaks directly to 
wider questions of the role of ideology in state formation and consolidation, that 
is, how political elites and state structures draw on, adapt, and are transformed 
by existing systems of belief and practice, and how ideology and practice are 
contested by different groups within and beyond the political elite.
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Such large-scale questions rely on an understanding of practice and belief 
on the level of individuals and their immediate social networks. While the con-
tributions to this special issue concentrate on this scale, whether they concern 
narratives of lying gods, the reflections of individual philosophers, villagers 
concerned with alleviating illness, coincidences of birth, or the disdain of 
roadside diviners for alternative methods, they all open windows onto wider 
socio-political contexts. Day-to-day interactions, shifting responses to life cir-
cumstances, and extended reflections involved in divinatory practice contrib-
ute in aggregate to the kind of large-scale changes just described. 
Through case studies like these, we are able to ask wider contextual ques-
tions. Is there something common to classical Greece and the Roman Empire 
and contemporary Han and Nuosu societies that makes specific connections 
between divination and ontology more likely? What are the broader social cor-
relates of divinatory ontology, and how do differences between these cases dif-
fer depending on wider social conditions? We might ask, for example, whether 
certain forms of ontological elaboration, such as divine communication versus 
cosmic index, are more or less favored for inquiring about different kinds of 
problems, or indeed whether different ontological frameworks tend to push 
clients toward certain inquiries and diviners toward certain diagnoses. This 
in turn invites attention to how the challenges clients face causally connect to 
questions of political structure, kin relations, prevailing moral norms, and/or 
economic circumstances. Such themes are explored in the articles in this issue, 
which coalesce around concepts of agency and calculation in divination.
Agentive and Calculatory Ontologies in Divination
The contributions to this issue cross-connect by identifying two tendencies 
in divinatory ontologies, which we label ‘agentive ontology’ and ‘calculatory 
ontology’. These refer, respectively, to divination considered as a form of com-
munication by agents such as gods or spirits, or as a calculation-like procedure 
based on constant principles. This comparative framework facilitates the kinds 
of questions concerning social correlates of different divination systems dis-
cussed above and explored on a case-by-case basis in the individual articles in 
this issue. The distinction hinges on the question of fallibility and deception as 
capacities attributed to the oracle itself, rather than to the diviner (to whom 
they are relevant in any divination system). Agentive systems present the logi-
cal possibility of false results, because agents, having the capacity to make their 
own decisions, may be afforded the capacity to deceive. Here ‘agency’ is to be 
understood precisely in terms of the capacity to exercise free will, rather than 
in terms of causal impact or possession of personhood. Thus, divinatory failure 
can be attributed to the divine agent as well as to the diviner. In contrast, the 
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logics of calculatory systems by definition cannot produce false results, mean-
ing that deception and fallibility are the preserve of the diviner. In this matter, 
the classical examples draw on divination systems that tend toward agentive 
ontologies and the Chinese examples on calculatory ones.3 Meanwhile, the 
Nuosu described by Swancutt draw on both kinds—bubbles in eggs provide 
diviners with calculatory indices, but their interpretation relies on the assistance 
of agentive spirits—illustrating that the distinction is one of tendencies rather 
than mutually exclusive categories. The affordances that agentive and calcula-
tory ontology provide for divinatory interpretation should therefore be taken as 
compatible with one another, or even capable of transforming each other. This 
is shown vividly by Simonetti’s discussion of various second-century ce Greek 
philosophical approaches to divination, which wrestle with the tension of at 
once conceiving the gods as agents but the cosmos as deterministic.
The framework of agency and calculation diverges from the ubiquitous 
distinction between mechanical and inspired forms, famously drawn by 
Cicero (1923: 235–237) in his De Divinatione and remarked on by scholars 
of divination ever since (Boyer 1990; Zeitlyn 1990). That distinction is one 
of methods—whether a result is arrived at through manipulation of some 
randomizing device or occurs via specific mental states such as visions or pos-
session. Agency and calculation refer instead to forms of ontology attached 
to divination; thus, forms of divination not subject to ontological elaboration 
would not form part of this framework. While it is difficult to imagine inspired 
divination practices that do not involve ontological elaboration (e.g., posses-
sion necessitates an explicit conception of spirits), it is logically possible that 
such practices could draw on a calculatory ontology, for instance, through the 
interpretation of visions according to fixed symbolic or indexical referents.4 
Likewise, a mechanical system of divination need not be calculatory. Many 
Greek and Roman forms of divination, such as those involving observation of 
birds, weather, or entrails, attributed their results5 to divine communication 
(Almqvist, this issue; Raphals 2013: 382). This framework should therefore be 
seen as complementing that between mechanical and inspired methods.
What is important for the agency/calculation framework is not how the 
result is practically derived but how its derivation is reflectively explained, that 
is, the ontological foundations of divinatory epistemology rather than the cat-
egories (ontological or not) referenced by divinatory results. For example, both 
the six lines method of Yijing divination (Matthews, this issue) and the eight 
signs method discussed by Homola (this issue) involve interpreting results 
according to a wide range of categories, some of which are ontological in the 
sense of deriving from the fundamental structure of the cosmos (such as forms 
of qi and their correlates), and some of which are not (individual people, spe-
cific places, etc.). However, it is not these categories, ontological or not, that 
give the practice a calculatory ontology.6 Instead, it is the broader conception 
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of a cosmos composed entirely of qi behaving according to constant laws that 
provides the ontological foundations for six lines prediction’s epistemology. 
Client circumstances are knowable because, deriving from constant principles 
of qi and its transformation through time and space, they are ontologically 
continuous with the coins used in divination, which necessarily fall in a way 
that reflects current cosmic conditions at a specific moment. Observing qi con-
figurations via the coins, with reference to their principles of transformation, 
allows diagnosis and prediction. Likewise, for agentive forms of divination like 
the Greek and Roman forms discussed by Almqvist and Simonetti in this issue, 
what is crucial is not whether gods are referenced by divinatory results, but 
the fact that the accuracy (or deceptiveness) of those results is justified on the 
basis of the communication of knowledge directly accessible to gods but not 
humans, based on their belonging to distinct ontological realms.
Of course, the degree to which such ontological assumptions are shared 
among and between diviners and clients varies. In his commentary in this issue, 
Zeitlyn accordingly cautions against the idea that ontology is something that 
divination, or a particular divination system, ‘has’. As he points out, properly 
speaking, ontological assumptions are located on the level of the individual, 
which may be more or less shared with others—a position similarly taken, 
although in more cognitive terms, by Matthews. This is directly relevant to 
the key comparative question of historical change via cultural transmission to 
which Feuchtwang attends in this issue, in line with recent work on civilizations 
as chains allowing for the transmission of ideas and practices (Feuchtwang and 
Rowlands 2019). While individuals will vary in their own understandings of 
divinatory ontology, such chains of transmission mean that techniques in the 
present are necessarily influenced by the ontological explanations of past divin-
ers and clients. Even if a present client of six lines or eight signs prediction does 
not subscribe to a qi-based ontology her/himself, the characteristics of those 
systems have nonetheless been historically transmitted based on, and reinforced 
by, such assumptions. Indeed, a key question for future comparative work is 
that of the degree to which broader distributions of ontological assumptions, 
such as religions, science, and political cosmologies, promote agentive or calcu-
latory explanations for divination and variation within those explanations—and 
whether histories of such explanations favor more or less the transmission of 
inspired or mechanical methods. The contributions to this special issue provide 
a solid empirical basis for such comparisons.
The Contributions
The articles begin with Swancutt’s analysis of vivid ethnographic material from 
work with Nuosu diviners in Southwest China. Taking up the use of chickens 
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and eggs in Nuosu divination as an idiom for the mutual causal relationship 
between divinatory procedure and diviners’ ontological assumptions, Swancutt 
opens the discussion by complicating the divide between agentive and calcu-
latory ontologies, as Nuosu divination involves a concurrent combination of 
both. For example, bubbles that appear in cracked open eggs and patterns in 
chicken bones provide microcosmic indices of clients’ illnesses, information 
about which is understood as being transmitted to the egg or chicken via bodily 
contact with the client. The bubbles in the egg often indicate the location of 
malign ghosts or spirits, located with the assistance of helper spirits as they 
are apt to attempt to conceal themselves. That is, while helper spirits are reli-
able, and the divinatory result is understood as reflecting the causes of illness 
via a calculatory explanation in which certain bubbles indicate certain causes, 
agency in the form of potential concealment of results, or clouding the divin-
ers’ insight, exists on the part of the malign ghosts or spirits. Ontologically, this 
rests not simply on a division between humans and spirits, but also on a divi-
sion between good and malign spirit beings with different potentials to deceive.
Almqvist’s examination of classical Greek views of divination takes us to the 
deceptive agency not of spirits, but of the gods themselves. His article focuses 
on a key intellectual problem posed by agentive divination: the fact that the 
existence of the gods as autonomous intentional agents relies on their capac-
ity—at least in theory—to deceive mortals. Here we see how the broader cos-
mology of classical Greek religion directly affected the perception of divination. 
The Greek gods had wills of their own, and their power lay in their access to 
greater knowledge than that of mortals and their agency over whether or not 
to pass on that knowledge through divination. The outcomes of even mundane 
mechanical divination procedures were understood as being guided by the will 
of the gods, and even the supremely trustworthy god Apollo was described as 
having the ability, and on one occasion the inclination, to intentionally deceive 
through the oracle. Almqvist demonstrates that this hinges on the conception of 
gods and mortal humans as ontologically distinct. Drawing on Descola’s (2013) 
conception of analogism, he argues that this precluded direct mortal access to 
divine knowledge, in contrast to the ontological continuity between inquirers 
and oracles found in homological Chinese divination systems, in which com-
mon cosmological principles facilitate direct knowledge of the subject of inquiry.
If a key intellectual problem for agentive divination is deception arising from 
ontological discontinuity between the divine and human realms, then for cal-
culatory divination the difficulty is repetition as a result of continuity. Homola 
takes this up in her analysis of ontological and epistemological categories in 
Han Chinese ‘eight signs’ (bazi) horoscopy. In this calculatory system, the time 
of a client’s birth, understood in terms of the cosmic forces of Heaven (tian) 
and the Five Phases (wuxing), is taken to determine the broad arc of his/her 
fate. However, by relying on an understanding of divinatory results reflecting 
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inherent cosmic principles following fixed temporal cycles of 60 years, eight 
signs horoscopy presents the problem of different individuals being born at the 
same time with the same fate. This, of course, is not borne out by experience, 
and has presented a problem for diviners resulting in centuries of exegesis. 
Rather than being understood as distinct ontological categories, groupings of 
people based on shared fate are instead understood as occupying statistical 
clusters, the eight signs system being a necessarily simplified description of 
temporal cycles that should be understood in conjunction with each individual’s 
unique environmental circumstances. As Homola shows, divination thus takes 
the form of calculations that render the vast number of possible horoscopes 
comprehensible to humans, relying on configurations determined by the ontol-
ogy of the cosmos.
Moving on from the intellectual problems that divinatory ontology poses 
for practitioners, Simonetti examines the problems that it poses for theorists—
whether first- and second-century ce Greek thinkers grappling with ontology as 
a branch of philosophy or contemporary anthropologists and classicists, many 
of whose own theories of divination are comprehensively anticipated in these 
earlier works. Indeed, Simonetti’s close analysis of the writings of Epictetus, 
Maximus of Tyre, and Dio Chrysostom reveals their own consideration of many 
of the analytical problems covered in this issue, from the reconciliation of 
notions of predictability with cosmology to the role of divine—and human—
agency. While all three figures saw divination very much as a philosophical 
‘problem’ with closely intertwined ontological and epistemological implications 
related to uncertainty, they approached it in different ways. Dio Chrysostom 
emphasized the difficulty of knowing the divine as a consequence of ontological 
separation, and Epictetus, like Feuchtwang in this issue, emphasized the role of 
divination as an exercise in pattern recognition. Maximus of Tyre, meanwhile, 
took the possibility of divination almost as undermining the ontological division 
between gods and mortals. In his writings the role of the gods becomes one of 
offering advice on the likely consequences of a given course of action rather 
than one of prognostication.
Indeed, on this Maximus of Tyre may have found common ground with Mas-
ter Tao, the practitioner of six lines prediction introduced in Matthews’s article. 
A Han Chinese practice cognate with eight signs horoscopy, but one that places 
greater emphasis on the role of qi as a fundamental energy-substance, six lines 
prediction calculates configurations of cosmic forces to provide advice on auspi-
cious times and places for action. Matthews focuses on the role of explanatory 
ontology in making divinatory techniques cognitively persuasive. The calcu-
latory assumptions underlying six lines prediction’s historical development 
are manifest in the complex correlative system used in its interpretation. This 
produces highly specific results following fixed rules, meaning that not only the 
procedural result (from throwing coins), but also the interpretation appears to 
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be outside the control of the diviner and is thus intuitively convincing, regard-
less of whether the client or diviner actually believes in the calculatory ontology 
itself. Meanwhile, reflective consideration of structural parallels between the 
ontological assumptions of qi cosmology and physics allows diviners to make 
a persuasive case that their practice is scientific. This is particularly significant 
in the political context of the People’s Republic of China, where divination is 
condemned as superstition.
However, not everyone finds ontology persuasive. Zeitlyn’s commentary pro-
vides a spirited critique of recent anthropological approaches associated with 
the ‘ontological turn’, presenting instead a call to focus on the messy reality of 
divinatory consultation and the contingency of conceptions attached to it. In 
particular, he cautions against the association of any singular ontology with 
a particular divination system. If we can talk of ontologies as conceptions of 
what exists, Zeitlyn argues, then it is as a shorthand for understandings broadly 
shared by participants in a given divinatory community, which is better under-
stood in epidemiological terms (Sperber 1996). Even then, however, it cannot 
be unproblematically supposed that the use of a divination system and implicit 
adherence to its explanations translate into belief in a certain order of beings in 
the world. In fact, Zeitlyn’s emphasis on the tension between what people say 
and what they do (to which it might be added, what they reflectively imagine 
they think and how they make spontaneous judgments and decisions) is key 
to providing an understanding of ontology conducive to the kind of cumulative 
and empirically driven comparative theory to which this special issue aspires. 
The utility of ontology lies in acknowledging that, far from being a totalizing 
explanation pertaining to the level of extrapolation that has led anthropologists 
to become so wary of words like ‘culture’, it must be understood as one of 
very many individualized and contingent responses to social life. Ontological 
assumptions might be more or less shared with others but are mobilized at 
certain times and in certain contexts to deal with, or as a reaction to, variable 
circumstances (rather appropriately for the subject of divination).
Indeed, Feuchtwang pays particular attention to the capacity of the ‘stocks 
of images’ integral to any divination system to provoke any number of subjec-
tive associations for its participants. While divination may be accompanied by 
ontological explanations and refer to kinds of being, Zeitlyn converges with 
Feuchtwang’s argument that divination itself is not primarily concerned with 
ontology—that is, ontological categorization is not the practice’s objective. 
Instead, divination is concerned with identifying the formation of a particular 
moment or place—the pattern recognition of Epictetus discussed by Simonetti, 
or the statistical approximation of fate in eight signs horoscopy described by 
Homola. Ontological considerations instead emerge in understandings of this 
moment or place and the process of its derivation, as part of the subjective 
‘worlds’ of divination’s participants. And these in turn, Feuchtwang argues, 
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collectively contribute to traditions of divination and the broader transmission 
of civilizational traditions through history.
Taken together, the contributions to this issue combine detailed examinations 
of specific divinatory practices with broader reflections on the transmission of 
ideas and the relationship between thought and action. They demonstrate the 
possibility of bringing together the ethnographically and historically particular 
to create an empirical record that can serve as a basis for generating compara-
tive categories and shedding light on the wider social and historical correlates 
of techniques and ideas. They illustrate distinct properties of agentive and 
calculatory forms of divination and their effects on how divinatory claims are 
understood, and refine the concept of ontology so that it can be consistently 
and realistically applied across social contexts as a contingent phenomenon of 
individual reflection and engagement in transmissions of practices, rather than 
as a straightforwardly generalizable fixed framework for perceiving the world.
Moreover, together they highlight the value of bringing together perspectives 
from anthropology and classics, or history more generally. Much is to be gained 
by asking anthropological questions from a temporal distance at which we 
can start to see the causes and results of long-term social processes, combined 
with the richness offered by humanistic study, in the case of the past, and the 
present-focused detail of real-time individual behavior and interaction afforded 
by ethnography. At the same time, the examination of historical sources, inher-
ently much more limited than what is observable to the anthropologist, has the 
potential to inspire more cautious and therefore more rigorous consideration of 
what can be reasonably concluded from ethnography. The absence of observ-
able practice can—or should—make it that much harder to spontaneously infer 
the often far too coherent frameworks of underlying cultural logics that can 
characterize more zealous anthropological projects, including those that assign 
underlying ontologies to societies. Sometimes this may require narrowing our 
focus, or even reining in our interpretive ambitions, but our theories will be 
the better for it.
Finally, it is difficult to see how the cumulative theoretical understanding of 
social practices can progress beyond a certain point without crossing disciplin-
ary barriers. The contributors to this special issue, whether from anthropology 
or from classics, converge on a view that comparison is possible; that divina-
tion and ontology, subject to critical consideration, are fertile grounds for it; 
and that cumulative empirical research holds the promise not only of refining 
concepts but also of generating productive explanatory frameworks. Such work 
may not eliminate uncertainties, but it does begin to recognize patterns and 
regularities to the point that a framework can be established so that we might 
begin to formulate explanations.
Introduction   |   15
Acknowledgments
My thanks to my fellow contributors for their comments on draft versions of 
this introduction and our discussions in the issue’s preparation. In addition, 
I would like to thank Thamira Andrews, Hugh Bowden, Stefanie Butendieck, 
Michael Scott, and Hans Steinmüller for their contributions to the workshop 
and discussion at LSE that gave rise to this special issue, and the two anony-
mous reviewers.
William Matthews is a Fellow in the Anthropology of China at the London 
School of Economics. He has conducted ethnographic research on Yijing divi-
nation in the People’s Republic of China and studies the relationship between 
cognition, the transmission of cosmological ideas, and the politics of knowledge 
in contemporary and early China. He has published articles on divination in 
China and the anthropology of ontology and is the author of Cosmic Coherence: 
A Cognitive Anthropology through Chinese Divination, which will be published 
by Berghahn Books in 2022. E-mail: w.matthews1@lse.ac.uk
Notes
 1. Such approaches have been criticized for their reliance on anthropologists’ 
own extrapolations of underlying ontological principles (Boyer 2010; Matthews 
2021, this issue).
 2. Raphals describes these interpretive indices as ‘signs’.
 3. In her comparative study of divination in early China and ancient Greece, Lisa 
Raphals (2013) similarly notes a general early Chinese emphasis on systematic 
cosmology, while ancient Greeks emphasized the role of the gods.
 4. Whether such systems exist in practice is a matter for large-scale comparison, 
as discussed above.
 5. Indeed, it makes sense that the distinction between agentive and calculative 
ontologies would apply similarly to observed omens such as those described 
by Caroline Humphrey (1976).
 6. As mentioned above, all divination methods necessarily refer to categories in 
the world, ontological or not, and as such this provides little meaningful basis 
for comparison.
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